

"These and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike."

--Plato

Kipple 64

Kipple is published and edited by Ted Pauls, 1448 Meridene Drive, Baltimore, Maryland, 21212. Copies of this journal of opinion and commentary are available in exchange for letters of comment, contributions (in the form of articles, verse, etc.), similar periodicals, or the cash sum of 20¢ per issue. The esoteric symbol in the address box informs the reader of his present status on the mailing list: a number is the number of the last issue which you will receive, the letter "T" indicates that we exchange publications, the letter "S" means this is a sample copy, and the letter "X" means I'd like to see you in a topless bathing suit. This issue is dedicated to Charles Crispin, who is in the hospital recuperating from an advanced case of Wisconsin shingles. -wokl-

AUGUST 26, 1964

A GRIM FAIRY TALE

(' ' ' ') "Once upon a time, there lived a kind, considerate man who
(o o) loved children. He was intelligent, unselfish and never
(v) got angry; he was married to a wonderful and respected wo-
((-)) man, and had many friends."

"One day, as he was strolling through the park, a band of hoodlums wielding knives and clubs attacked him. The kindly man did not wish to harm anyone, so he merely smiled and kept his hands at his sides. There were many other people in the park, but most of them simply looked on."

(' ' ' ')
(o o)
(v)
((-))

(' ' ' ') "One of the onlookers, a boy named John, said that, after
(o o) all, he didn't have all the evidence, and for all he knew
(v) the attackers might have every right to assault the kind-
((-)) ly man."

"Another of the watchers was a man named Dave. He took note of the fact that the people who were going to the aid of the kindly man were mostly notorious liars anyway, so he thought the attackers must be in the right."

(' ' ' ')
(o o)
(v)
((-))

(' ' ' ') "A man named Danny, standing in the crowd, said he had
(o o) never liked the kindly man much anyway, so even if his
(v) attackers were merely malicious hoodlums he certainly
((-)) wasn't going to try to stop them."

"Another bystander named Jason walked up to the kindly man, now writhing in pain on the ground, and kicked him in the ribs just for the hell of it."

(' ' ' ')
(o o)
(v)
((-))

(' ' ' ') "This added cruelty rather shocked a man named Buck, but
(o o) he couldn't interfere in the attack either: he was too
(v) busy telling the others that the kindly man's defenders
((-)) were being too emotional."

"Later, when it was all over and the body was carted away, these innocent bystanders got together for a cup of coffee at a nearby restaurant."

(' ' ' ')
(o o)
(v)
((-))

(' ' ' ') "While they were there, someone mentioned the woman who
(o o) had recently been stabbed to death in Brooklyn while 39
(v) people watched silently. Everybody shook their head sadly
((-)) and muttered, oh, what a terrible thing."

THE BATTLE OF TONKIN GULF: The single question posed most frequently in the days immediately following the attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin was: why? Even the atmosphere of crisis generated by this seemingly senseless foray and the subsequent retaliation by the United States Navy failed to submerge the obvious bewilderment of everyone concerned, both within and without the government. The feeling of astonishment experienced by most Americans was more acute even than the accompanying righteous indignation--for, after all, the past twenty years of Cold War have dulled the capacity of even proud people such as ourselves to be righteously indignant. In some quarters, there exists a tendency to dismiss such questions by retorting that one cannot hope to understand the motives which impel the Communists to undertake certain actions, but this is not so much a comment on the affair as it is an admission of ignorance. No one has ever succeeded in demonstrating that Communists are radically different from other members of the human race in at least one important respect: they possess the same inclination to do at all times what is in their best interest, as they conceive it. The Chinese Communists may be bellicose, but they are not irrational to the extent that they would undertake or authorize others to undertake actions without having considered in advance the probable results and concluded that the course of action decided upon offered some significant opportunity to improve their position. After the initial naval encounter, on Sunday, August 2nd, it was widely assumed, because no logical motive could be discovered, that the attack on the USS Maddox was an accident or the result of a low-level military decision. The second battle, in which Communist torpedo boats engaged the destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy, demonstrated that this assumption was erroneous, and indicated the existence of an underlying policy in the context of which the deliberate attacks on United States naval vessels made some sort of sense.

What, then, is this underlying purpose? What do the Communists of North Vietnam and China believe that they stand to gain by goading the mighty Seventh Fleet into combat? Obviously, North Vietnam has little hope of constituting much more than a minor annoyance to American naval power in the Pacific; nor would the Chinese profit by provoking an air-and sea-war in that theatre, since the United States is especially strong--and China especially weak--in this respect. In view of this, it would appear that the motive behind these attacks was not a directly military one. After eliminating the manifestly absurd suggestions (e.g., that North Vietnam undertook to antagonize the United States Navy without Chinese authorization, in a calculated attempt to force China into open conflict with the Western powers, or that the attacks were staged by South Vietnamese personnel in an effort to provoke the United States into direct participation in the war), two probable reasons for the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin emerge: (1) the action in that area is being undertaken in order to divert the attention of the United States from possible heightened Communist activity in another region (e.g., Laos); or (2) the attacks were carried out for the express purpose of

JOTTINGS FROM THE
EDITOR'S DESK

discovering how far the United States would be willing to go in reacting to such a challenge. (These aims are not, of course, necessarily mutually exclusive.)

The first hypothesis appears rather doubtful. Indeed, it could be argued that an increase in Communist military activity in any sector would have the effect of increasing the alertness of American military forces in every region, and therefore diverting the attention of the United States from an area of potential aggression would be better accomplished by means other than instigating a crisis in the Gulf of Tonkin. The second possibility appears to be the most likely. There is, of course, a great deal of precedent in this Cold War era for the practice of testing an opponent's courage and determination by precipitating a crisis and observing his response; the Soviet Union is engaging in the same sort of game, albeit less crudely, when Russian troops delay U.S. military convoys on the Autobahn. If this is indeed the operative motive in this instance, then the attacks in the Tonkin Gulf probably had the additional purpose of serving as a Chinese gambit in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This may easily be perceived by examining the nature of the conflict between the Communist powers. One of the major areas--some would consider it the major area--of disagreement is the extent to which a large-scale war (implying a thermonuclear exchange) should be avoided at the expense of other interests. The Chinese Communists claim that the United States is a "paper tiger", i.e., a country which appears on the surface to be a dangerous adversary but which would fail to adequately resist a Communist military advance should one be initiated. The Russians, on the other hand, contend that the United States is deadly serious in promising to check any overt Communist aggression, and thus counsel the utmost caution. If, as I suspect, the Tonkin Gulf incidents were an attempt to discredit the Soviet view and demonstrate the validity of the Chinese contention, it has failed rather decisively, and the Russians, despite public utterances to the contrary, may be assumed to be secretly gratified that the United States responded as forcefully as it did.

Whether or not this view of the situation is a wholly accurate one, it seems clear that President Johnson and his advisers have acted on these basic assumptions. This would explain, in part, the harshness of the United States counter-action, which Prof. Jiri Hajek, Czechoslovakia's ambassador to the United Nations, correctly termed "not legitimate retaliation" but a "reprisal" in violation of the United Nations Charter. Ordinarily, destroying the attacking torpedo boats and serving notice that a similar response would be encountered if future attacks occurred would have been a sufficient demonstration of this country's determination to resist aggression. The matter could then have been taken before the U.N. Security Council for further consideration. This would have been fully in keeping with the pattern of behavior evolved by the major powers during the past twenty years. (The maxim governing conduct of foreign policy in this era of ideological conflict is Newton's famous aphorism, "For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction"--with the emphasis on "equal".) But President Johnson's response was a departure from traditional policy. By ordering air strikes against ships and port facilities within the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the President was engaging in the much-discussed but too little understood process of "escalation". The Communists in Hanoi and Peking were then faced with the alternatives of further escalation (air attacks against the USS Constellation and USS Ticonderoga might have been the appropriate maneuver had this course been chosen), stabilization (in this case, ignoring the Tonkin Gulf area and taking some limited but still forceful action elsewhere), or retreat (protest through diplomatic channels, attempting to paint a picture of "United

States aggression" for propaganda purposes, etc.); in the terminology of the poker player, they were confronted with the choice of raising, calling or folding. Equating this policy with a game of chance is not at all inappropriate, for it is, like poker, a gamble which promises great gains to those smiled upon by fortune but contains the implicit risk of disaster.

In this particular instance, fortunately, the recourse to "brinksmanship" is somewhat less hazzardous than would ordinarily be the case, because it is probable that the original provocative actions on the part of the North Vietnamese were a calculated attempt to draw a response and had no other motive. If the policy-makers in the cabinet concluded, as I did, that the attacks on our destroyers were a test of sorts, this would explain President Johnson's willingness to engage in escalation, since the assumption would be that North Vietnam/China wished only to see what our response would be and had no intention of instituting counter-measures of their own so long as we reacted within reasonable limitations.

Our somewhat zealous response to what were, in fact, innocuous raids must also be attributed in part to the domestic political situation. After all, one of Senator Goldwater's major contentions since he became a candidate for the Presidency has been that the United States must more readily use its strength to defend its interests around the world, coupled with the complaint (naturally) that the incumbent administration has been lax in this respect. This criticism has now been rendered virtually useless. Should Mr. Goldwater now condemn the Johnson Administration for "weakness in the face of aggression", the President need only reply: "What do you mean, 'weakness'? When North Vietnam attacked two American destroyers, I crippled their entire naval establishment; what more do you want?" One cannot help but wonder if President Johnson's response to the Vietnamese attacks would have been quite so fierce had this not been an election year.

Apparently, the President and his advisers calculated correctly the willingness of the Communists to accept our "punishment" for the sea raids without escalating the conflict still further. The sense of elation and self-confidence invariably generated by the knowledge that one has gambled successfully and won should not be permitted to obscure the fact that our action was extremely precipitous and, I believe, largely unnecessary. The spectacle of Lyndon Johnson attempting to out-Goldwater Goldwater is indeed a depressing one; whatever happened to that "unrelenting peace offensive" proclaimed by the President shortly after he acceded to office?

A GREAT MORAL ISSUE? When Senator J. William Fulbright delivered his now-famous speech on flexibility in foreign policy, it appeared certain that this address, stressing as it did the need to entertain "unthinkable" thoughts, would inaugurate a lengthy and productive dialogue on the topic of foreign policy. Such a controversy could only have benefitted the nation--indeed, the entire Western alliance--in the final analysis, and the immediate response to Senator Fulbright's discourse was highly promising. Interest soon began to wane, however, and the eagerly anticipated dialogue failed to materialize. I suppose that there is still, somewhere, a segment of the liberal intelligentsia which believes that the controversy continues to rage, but as the remainder of society is managing nicely to ignore this small clique the significance attached to their debate is negligible. It is perhaps an accurate index to the intellectual composition of our society that the dominant controversy of the day is not concerned with the ultimate aims and most efficient means of United States foreign policy, but rather with the moral acceptability of topless bathing suits. Granted, the

rest of society is under no obligation to consider important what I consider important, and granted that others are not necessarily in error because they fail to do so--nevertheless, it is difficult to resist the observation that there is something a bit pathetic about a society, faced with so many complex and demanding problems, concerning itself with the singularly irrelevant topic of the morality of topless bathing suits.

Although the controversy itself is, on the surface, a new one, it is actually merely the latest installment in a continuing feud between liberals and conservatives in a society which may be said to be still emerging from the Victorian Era. What distinguishes this from other controversies in which liberal and conservative attitudes are found to be in conflict is this: the argument is so insignificant in the context of today's formidable problems that most of the articulate liberals and conservatives are attempting to avoid it in order to give their full attention to more pressing questions, thus abandoning the battlefield to those individuals in both camps whose mental horizons cannot tolerate a controversy of broader significance. The dispute has therefore deteriorated into an unseemly brawl between the ubiquitous moralists and doom-cryers, on the one hand, and the immature and insecure nonconformists whose espousal of radical causes is as unthinking as it is vehement, on the other. The first group is now in ascendancy, but we may be confident that the defenders of topless bathing suits will gather their legions and before long launch a spirited counter-attack. Meanwhile, those of us who view these proceedings with amusement can pass the time by analyzing the psyches of the protagonists.

One interesting fact which immediately impresses itself upon the layman attempting such an analysis is that both contingents are impelled by essentially the same motive. In general, the leading opponents of "toplessness" are fairly typical puritans, the foot-soldiers of piety whose distorted view of sex as something sinful which must be suppressed is the result of childhood experiences for which they cannot be held responsible. This obstreperous aggregation is led by middle-aged psychological capons who, because they have never seen a bare female breast outside of Playboy magazine, believe that no one else has a right to, either. Recruits for this ludicrous army of censors are in good supply as a result of the essentially negative nature of modern-day Christianity, which teaches that one may be a "good Christian" and aspire to Heaven merely by refraining from certain well-defined thoughts and actions. Considering the extent to which this underlying attitude permeates the religious sphere of our society, it is not so surprising that this era has produced a remarkable abundance of censors.

Strangely enough, the foremost proponents of topless bathing suits may generally be supposed to have encountered the same problems as youngsters, but their response to these early experiences differs dramatically. Instead of avoiding sex, they attempt to immerse themselves in it; instead of condemning sexual activity as sinful, they elevate it to an absurd position of reverence. These are the individuals--we are all acquainted with at least one--who talk incessantly about their incredibly varied (and largely imaginary) experiences with members of the opposite sex. The advocates of "toplessness" also include outright exhibitionists, individuals who, for want of anything better to do, would walk around with carrots in their ears.

The most interesting fact about the entire controversy, then, is that the topic does not deserve the attention it has received. As to the issue itself, what can one say? There is, of course, the "normal" (and presumably healthy) male reaction, "Off to the beach!", but then one begins to realize that many women do not have especially attractive breasts and that these are the ones most likely to wear topless bathing

suits (just as, presently, tight shorts are most commonly worn by fat, middle-aged housewives and scrawny, sexless teenagers). Even the expected liberal reaction (viz., "What an individual wears is his own damned business") seems insufficient, in view of the remarks of some opponents of topless bathing suits equating the present "decadence" with the situation which presaged the fall of Rome. Perhaps the most effective comment on the matter was made, obliquely, by an editorial in the Baltimore Sun. Entitled "The Swim Suit Scandal", this bit of commentary attempted to place the controversy in its proper perspective, and opened with these paragraphs:

"The new bathing suits, said the New York police commissioner, had so 'weakened the barriers between the sexes' that he would have to hire 200 extra policewomen to cope with the breakdown in morals. Resorts banned them: Manhattan Beach hired a man with a tape measure to make sure ladies wore enough clothing to cover them, and police chased wearers of the new suits off boardwalks in Atlantic City and Coney Island.

"Frostburg, Maryland, also banned the suits. Round Bay insisted that bathers must wear a skirt or fringe over them. A Nebraska woman campaigned nation-wide for a return to the 'modest, decent bathing suit our grandmothers wore,' according to The Sun. That was in the summer of 1924, when the whole country was in an uproar about the one-piece 'Annette Kellerman' costume, which revealed the figure, bared the arms, cleared the knees and, horror of horrors, was worn without stockings."

Thinking of the man who, when informed that his daughter was a call-girl, replied, "Well, it keeps her off the streets," we can perceive the single positive result of this ridiculous controversy: if the moralists and censors spend all of their time condemning topless bathing suits, they won't have time to burn books or pole-axe school teachers for attempting to induce original thought in their pupils.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND CHILE: On September 4th, the Republic of Chile will conduct its national elections, and on the following November 13th a left-leaning President will be inaugurated. In view of the talent for erroneous predictions which this magazine has displayed in previous political contests this year, such an assertion might be thought an example of over-confidence. However, since the only two candidates of any importance for the Presidency of Chile both fit this description very accurately, the confidence appears justified. Dr. Salvador Allende, a socialist running on the ticket of the Communist-supported Frente de Accion Popular (Popular Action Front Party or FRAP), appears to be the pre-election favorite, but Senator Eduardo Frie Montalva, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, is running a very close second and still has an excellent chance of capturing a plurality in the election. Certain segments of the press in this country have apparently decided that Dr. Allende is evil incarnate, with the result that Senator Frie is increasingly being depicted as a moderate; actually, the political difference between the two candidates is one of degree only, and the United States may expect to be confronted with formidable difficulties in dealing with the new President, whoever he may be.

Dr. Allende, formerly a practicing psychiatrist, claims to be what may best be described as a "democratic Marxist". In defining his

political position at an outdoor rally, Allende said: "I am not a Communist. I am the founder of the Socialist party. And because I am a good Socialist, I have to be at the side of my Communist brothers." At another rally, Dr. Allende told an enthusiastic crowd that, if elected, his government would be "democratic, national and of the people." The Chilean socialist openly admires Fidel Castro and Cheddi Jagan, as do most of the reform-minded politicians in Latin America, and professes the degree of anti-Americanism which is expected of a candidate for any political office in most of the Latin American republics.

Senator Frie may possibly be considered a "moderate" by comparison with his opponent, but his proposals for the social and economic improvement of the nation differ only quantitatively and seem designed to achieve the same ultimate goals professed by FRAP but by using less heavy-handed methods. Senator Frie is a Christian Democrat, a designation which means exactly nothing and should not be permitted to serve as the basis for any assumptions about the sort of action he may be expected to authorize if elected. (There are as many varieties of Christian Democrats in Latin America as there are Republicans in the United States. Brazil's Christian Democratic Party may serve as an illustration. It is divided into three quite distinct branches, the left, center and right, which control the party in turns depending upon the orientation of the country as a whole at any particular time. The right-wing sector of Brazil's Christian Democratic Party is sufficiently conservative to have supported for the Brazilian Presidency retired Marshal Juarez Tavora, who was defeated in 1955 by Juscelino Kubitschek; the Left Christian Democrats are led by Paulo de Tarso Santos, the Minister of Education in the former administration of Joao Goulart. Frie, the Chilean candidate, is probably at least as far left as de Tarso Santos.)

Chile is of vast importance to the United States as well as to the entire Western world because it produces more than twenty percent of the free world's copper. Much of this production is under the control of two American companies, the Anaconda and Kennecott Copper Companies; the combined value of the three mines and related processing plants operated by these two corporations has been estimated as high as \$1,000,000,000. Dr. Allende has announced that, under his government, these facilities will be expropriated if at some time in the future the situation appears to warrant such action, and if nationalizing these copper mines deprives Chile of its traditional markets for the metal he has proposed seeking new markets in Eastern Europe. Senator Frie would

(' ' ' ')	"Have you ever noticed how Presidents become identified
(o o)	with certain games or sports? Truman liked to walk, Ei-
(v)	senhower was a devoted golfer, Kennedy played touch
(())	football..."

"I used to wonder what game or sport President Johnson fa-	(' ' ' ')
vored. He kind of seemed like a handball man to me. Then	(o o)
the North Vietnamese attacked us in the Gulf of Tonkin,	(v)
and I found out what Lyndon Johnson's favorite game was."	(())

(' ' ' ')	
(o o)	
(v)	"Russian roulette."
((o))	

like to avoid the outright confiscation of this American property, and envisions as an immediate step only the strict regulation of the copper industry and government intervention in its marketing. He would consider expropriation as a last resort, however, so his election would by no means eliminate the possibility of the American companies losing their traditional stranglehold on Chile's copper supply.

After November, and barring some sort of right-wing coup (which appears unlikely, as no presidential election in Chile has been circumvented by a revolution since 1931), the United States will be forced to deal with one of these men. The situation very closely parallels that of the United States vis-à-vis Cuba in the months immediately following Fidel Castro's seizure of power. Then as now, the United States was confronted with a left-leaning popular leader, fiercely independent but willing to accept assistance and remain on friendly terms; in the earlier situation, the United States, by its suspicion of reform and unwillingness to accept a mildly socialistic state in the Caribbean, forced Castro to look elsewhere for the desperately-needed aid and thus commit himself to an unnatural alliance with a power halfway across the world. Unless we have learned a great deal in the intervening years, we may, by our refusal to accept socialism as a valid means of economic improvement for underdeveloped countries, alienate the Republic of Chile and compel that nation to forge ties with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe which neither Dr. Allende nor Senator Frie truly desire. Ingenuous jingoes like the Senator from Arizona will, of course, counsel intervention and reprisal; but this will only accelerate the process by which we may yet manage to throw away all of Latin America.

HERMAN KAHN AND HIS ELECTRIC STRATEGY: During the past three or four years, Herman Kahn, the Director of the Hudson Institute, has gained an impressive reputation as America's foremost nuclear warfare enthusiast. At first glance, the term "enthusiast" may appear to be somewhat inappropriate in this connection, but upon reflection one discovers that it is entirely applicable. There are, in this country, many model-train enthusiasts who devote their leisure time to directing diminutive railroads and automobile enthusiasts whose available time is spent in tinkering with a variety of cars, foreign and domestic, contemporary and antique; Herman Kahn is a nuclear warfare enthusiast, a hobbyist devoting his time and energy to planning holocausts, countering paper strategies with other paper strategies, and calculating to the eighteenth decimal the amount of genetic damage he feels we ought to be willing to accept in order to prevail.

Reading Kahn is an experience which can only be compared to perusing the personal diaries of key figures in the hierarchy of the Third Reich. There is, in the work of Herman Kahn, the same callousness and utter disregard for human life which characterized the attitude prevalent among the German Nazis, particularly those who were concentration camp administrators. Hoess and Müller employ euphemisms such as "actions" when they mean pogroms and refer to the "processing" of "shipments"; Kahn writes of "counterforce + bonus" and the necessity of retaining a capacity for "Postattack Coercion". In each case, the horror of what is being discussed is heightened by the businesslike, matter-of-fact manner in which the subject is considered. When Rudolph Hoess reports, with a touch of pride, that on a single day in 1944 the ovens at Auschwitz disposed of 9000 inmates, there is little indication that Hoess realizes he is talking about human beings, innocent of any crime save their religious heritage. Similarly, Kahn notes in passing: "The way one seems to arrive at the upper limit of 60 million is rather interesting." In glancing at this sentence, one might suppose that Kahn

was referring to 60 million heads of lettuce or 60 million sheets of paper; but no, these are 60 million human lives--indeed, 60 million American lives--, the expendable factor in Herman Kahn's little game.

Planning a nuclear holocaust apparently fulfills a psychological need in certain individuals. It is comparable to a chess game, in which entire populations are shifted about like pawns, and indulging in this sort of mental exercise produces a stimulating feeling of omnipotence. In "Fail-Safe", Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler introduce a character named Walter Groteschele, who is so obviously patterned after Herman Kahn that Kahn might be justified in accusing Burdick and Wheeler of character assassination. Groteschele/Kahn possesses an "I-am-a-great-big-military-planner" complex, and is a man who, due to a psychological quirk, is capable of contemplating the end of the world with a sort of perverse satisfaction. Such a man would be a splendid discovery for any third-year psychology student. Unfortunately, focusing a penetrating searchlight on the man and exploring his hidden (and altogether disgusting) motives does not end the danger; at the conclusion of "Fail-Safe", Groteschele is deprived of his audience and therefore his influence, but Kahn, not as susceptible a target as the Burdick-Wheeler imitation, remains an important figure, still able to gain a suitably awestruck audience for his views and still possessing influence within the defense establishment.

Most of Herman Kahn's critics, moreover, seem content to point out his apparent inability to experience any sort of emotion at the thought of 60 or 70 million deaths, and complacently assume that he has been vanquished thereby. The error of these critics is a traditionally human one, and lies in the assumption that those who admire Kahn's theories do so merely out of ignorance and will quickly recant once their error is demonstrated. But because Herman Kahn appeals to the sort of people who take great pride in being realistic about someone else's misery, it is not sufficient to accuse him of inhumanity and disregard for life; the strategy advocated by Kahn must be examined and demolished on its own terms and only on its own terms, if the victory is to be decisive.

Fortunately, this undertaking is not at all the difficult one it may appear on the surface. Kahn's nuclear strategy, as complicated and all-inclusive as it may appear, is founded on a single assumption: viz., that, in a hypothetical future nuclear war, neither antagonist will concentrate the entire force of his arsenal against an opponent's cities. That is to say, Herman Kahn is a counterforce strategist. His casual willingness to further national policy by engaging in a thermonuclear exchange, his belief that shelter programs have some value in urban areas, his blasé acceptance of the probability that we may have to engage in several nuclear wars in the foreseeable future--all of this is dependent upon the validity of the "counterforce" notion. Even Kahn admits that there are circumstances under which a shelter program would be virtually useless ("...in certain types of attack," he observes in Commentary, "civil defense plans would be useless"; and, elsewhere in the same essay, "The worst possible kind of attack (...) presents a virtually impossible problem of protecting those in target areas"). And even Kahn concedes that the casualties resulting from a certain kind of nuclear war would be so numerous that war would not be justified (in "On Thermonuclear War", he admits: "Almost nobody wants to go down in history as the first man to kill 100,000,000 people"). The key to unravelling Kahn's entire strategy is that he does not believe this maximum type of nuclear war is likely to occur.

He reasons thusly: Should the Soviet Union attack the United States (or vice versa), the aggressor would attempt to destroy the capacity of the victim to retaliate. Then, after the initial attack had

effectively disarmed the unfortunate nation, it could be compelled to surrender by the threatened destruction of its cities and their populations. Provided that all of the combatants in this hypothetical nuclear war accept the counterforce strategy, according to which the military establishments duel, lobbing hydrogen bombs back and forth, while the civilian population looks on anxiously from the comparative safety of the sidelines, each participant will refrain from attacking another's cities and expect the same courtesy in return. They will act in this exemplary manner because, presumably, each nation trusts its opponents to reciprocate the favor of sparing civilian populations, and (more importantly) because no nation possesses sufficient megatonnage to destroy an opponent's retaliatory capacity while at the same time devastating his cities.

Let us, for the moment, be as hard-nosed and unemotional as Mr. Kahn, and attempt to perceive a few of the more outstanding fallacies inherent in this strategy. First of all, the "reciprocal kindness" concept is incredibly naive; if the United States and the Soviet Union cannot trust each other sufficiently to agree on disarmament or arms control, why should they trust each other to be "nice guys" when bombs are raining down and millions of human deaths are crying out to be avenged? (Even if an attack were confined to military targets, several millions of people on each side would become casualties "incidentally".) By the very nature of the situation (i.e., mutual distrust and animosity) which makes nuclear warfare a possibility, each country would have to assume that its adversary intended to launch a maximum attack, and respond appropriately.

Furthermore, the counterforce strategy can be valid only for a nation which disavows the "first strike" and assumes that it will be the victim of a sneak attack. Once a country has been attacked, it is hardly reasonable to assume that it will retaliate against the now empty bases of its opponent. Thus, Herman Kahn's assumption that both blocs will accept the counterforce notion implies that neither will under any circumstances start the war. It is hardly necessary to point out that, if this is true, we haven't anything to worry about, anyway...

Kahn's practical argument, that the nuclear capabilities of both sides are too limited to undertake with any hope of success attacks against both the retaliatory capacity and population of the enemy state, purports to support his counterforce contentions, but actually, as I will demonstrate, this argument delivers the fatal blow to the now moribund form of the counterforce strategy. This view of the respective nuclear capabilities of the major powers is precisely correct, but Kahn manages to draw from it a momentarily erroneous conclusion. The Soviet Union, say the counterforce strategists, is prohibited by its limited nuclear capability from launching effective strikes against both our retaliatory capacity and our population; therefore, they must choose between the two. Kahn and his fellow counterforce advocates believe that they will decide, in the event of war, to direct the major force of the assault against the United States' retaliatory capacity, i.e., our missile installations and bombers. But is this really practical?

Missiles are, after all, entrenched in concrete bunkers or aboard highly mobile submarines. How great an attack would be necessary by either side in order that they might be reasonably certain of having crippled the retaliatory capacity of the other? Consider, for a single example, the United States' missile complex at Malmstrom A. F. B., Montana. On this sprawling site are situated approximately 150 Minuteman missiles, each equipped with a multi-megaton warhead. The missiles are housed in hardened silos, built to withstand anything short of a direct hit by a large nuclear device, and for further safety the silos are separated from one another by sufficient distance that a single nuclear

explosion, almost no matter how powerful, could destroy no more than one missile. Consider, in addition, that ICBMs are not outstandingly accurate. A missile launched from the Soviet Union toward the continental United States could usually be depended upon to strike within three or four miles of its target. If that target is New York City and the missile carries a high-megaton warhead, this degree of inaccuracy is of little practical significance (especially since New York, along with other major metropolitan areas, would doubtless be the target of more than a single missile). But when the target is a concrete bunker two blocks long and one block wide, which can only be destroyed by a direct hit (in nuclear terms, this does not mean that the missile would have to strike the roof of the silo), this inaccuracy suddenly looms most important. How many Soviet missiles would be necessary to neutralize the retaliatory capacity at Malmstrom A. F. B.? Two hundred? Three hundred? Five hundred? Multiply this figure by the number of similar missile complexes which presently exist as part of the United States nuclear deterrent force, throw in the Polaris submarines and SAC bases here and abroad, and the counterforce strategy becomes patently ridiculous.

The strategic concept of destroying an opponent's capacity to retaliate has been rendered obsolete by modern technology. The retaliatory capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet Union are now, to all intents and purposes, invulnerable. If either nation were forced into the position of initiating a thermonuclear exchange, population centers would be the only reasonable targets, because hurling one's nuclear strength against missile bases would be like shooting at needles in a haystack.

Kahn himself appears to recognize this when, in Yale Political (Spring, 1964), he comments that

"...we have acquired highly invulnerable forces that need not react rapidly to survive attack. In fact, our forces are invulnerable enough to allow decision-makers to wait until even after a very large attack and evaluate the situation before deciding to retaliate."

At this point, the intricate thought-processes operating within Herman Kahn's mind leave me completely bewildered. How is it possible, except through Orwellian doublethink, to believe simultaneously that (1) our retaliatory capacity is "highly invulnerable", so much so, in fact, that we can afford to sit quietly through a heavy attack, casually survey the damage at its conclusion, and calmly decide upon the appropriate response, and (2) the Soviet Union, should it decide to initiate a nuclear war, would waste its offensive nuclear capacity by attempting to destroy this invulnerable retaliatory capability?

--Ted Pauls

"...the Chinese have not divided the universe into a worldly realm and a spiritual realm, but have considered it a great integrated unity. All that exists, they thought, is a vast natural reality, in which men and spirits share the same plane of existence, without either one being 'better' in any sense than the other. The Chinese, consequently, have not concerned themselves with distinctions between existence and nonexistence, between what is real and what is ideal, between the natural and the unnatural, or between the sacred and the profane. They have seen nothing either in their many gods or in themselves that correspond's to the Westerner's notion of awesome divinity." --Charles O. Hucker, in "Asia in the Modern World".

DISSENTING OPINIONS

letters of comment on past issues

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I found your article on Marx very interesting, and I only wish that more people would take the time to read theories that are condemned. There would then be someone to talk to, more than the few experts I already know. I have certain disagreements with you, as I have certain disagreements (hardly the same ones) with Marx. Karl Popper, in "The Open Society and Its Enemies", brings out most of the valid objections to Marx's theory, and of them, the fallacy of an attempt to predict future history is the most important.

My disagreements with you are simpler. I think you underestimate the poverty that still resides in our "affluent" society. I base my disagreement not only on statistics, although there are plenty of those, but also on my own life, which has been spent in poverty, and not alone. I also do not think that the political control of governments by capitalists has become less; I think it has merely become more deceptive. Television indoctrination makes us march in step while we think we are marching in free, spontaneous, got-that-rhythm. C. Wright Mills discusses the power basis of the U.S.A., thoroughly, in "The Power Elite". He thinks that there is an elite still there, and so do I. And not proletarians, or the proletarian class, though there may be a manager or two who rose from the bottom.

Ted, for X's sake ("X" is a medieval abbreviation for "Christ"), don't get rid of your best and most hilarious writer, A. G. Smith. It's a good thing I'm not back in Ohio, because I might let my sense of humor get the best of me, especially with a few beers, and invite A. G. up a convenient dark alley--they have alleys in Norwalk, unless it's changed a lot.

I admit it's beer money that keeps a bum like me poor, A. G., but it doesn't weaken me any. If you, A. G., think that might make right, I will be glad to take time off and convert you--I'll try not to do permanent damage, of course, and you may wear an iron jockstrap if you want to even up the odds.

You know, A. G., not all radicals are feeble sons-of-bitches. Some of us protect the weak and poor because we are strong enough to have energy left over. And as for preferring Congolese cannibals to you, cousin A. G., well, are you willing to put it on the line? I know what I like.

I always thought it was just scared guys who couldn't take a chance on being kind to the stranger.

George Price: Price, has no one told you about the Enlightenment? The principles of the founders of this country were developed in the 18th century, in a period when religious toleration and separation of the Church and State were most important issues. Men like Washington and Franklin were well-known Freemasons, and Freemasons were dedicated to secularization, and they were Deists. Deism is the belief in the God of

Nature, not the Xian God. Many Deists, like Voltaire, who called Christianity "the infamous thing", believed that miracles and revelations were delusions and tricks, and that the true religion of Nature was all that was needed. I can't imagine where you, Price, got the idea that the founders of this country were all pious Christians, unless you picked it up in your gradeschool days, while reciting the Lord's Prayer.

Charles Crispin: A very good letter, Crispin; I am glad to see someone comment on the basic fear that underrides the Social Darwinism of the conservatives. To hear one of them talk, you would think we were in constant danger from the "lower classes", "lower races", "lowdown Communists", and what have you. Now, me, I don't always have to be setting up defensive maneuvers against my fellowmen, because actually I have little to fear from them. Most people who are strong worry more about hurting someone else inadvertently than they do about how to defend themselves. Men of other races are no danger to me. The Soviets are no danger to me. And I figure that if any danger arises, I can handle it when the time comes. If this seems incredible to the conservatives among us, because I am a "poor, weak" woman, I suggest they consult with someone who has met me, especially before going up a dark alley to meet me.

Kevin Langdon: My dear Langdon, that was a beautiful exposition of the real issue in the Donaho-Breen affair, and I only wish I could have put it so succinctly. Exactly, one doesn't object to Breen's exclusion because he is sweet, but regardless of what he is like. It isn't the likeable person who needs to have his rights defended. We must each of us learn to defend the rights even of our worst enemy, if we want there to be rights left.

Moreover, those who refuse to judge, because they don't absolutely know who is innocent and who is guilty in the Donaho-Breen mess, are missing the point of reserved judgement. The idea is--that if you don't know who is guilty, then you fight against restrictions and/or punishments for anyone. As far as I am concerned, and it would be the same if I didn't know the participants at all, both Walter Breen and William L. Donaho should be allowed to go to the convention--no matter how repulsive either of them may be, or how sweet.

Langdon, birth control opponents make a mistake when they attempt to theorize on the beginning and limits of humanity in the fetus. Most biologists consider the fetus, of any species, to be different from the newborn, not yet a living member of the species, although it possesses all the organs and parts, because it is not yet functioning as a unit and independently. You see, we become human by reacting with our environment. For example, we cannot be said to be thinking, in the characteristic human manner, in the womb, because we have not yet any subject matter to think about. When we come out of the womb--at once we are operating in a highly integrated manner that was not previously necessary--we are completely alive. In the womb, we are just not-dead, we are in abeyance, and there is a difference.

Ted, most of your quotations are delightful, but I will take issue with the one where Margaret Mead approves of India's caste system because it provides such colorful variety. Now I am all for variety, but I don't think that unless one is forced, by caste or servitude, to be different, then we would all be monotonously alike. On the contrary, the best examples of variety come when everyone is free to choose his own fantastic differences.

Moreover, Mead is forgetting that in caste societies one cannot mingle with the people of other castes, so the pleasures of variety are lost. One of my primary objections to racism is that the racists interfere with my enjoyment of all the different kinds of people there are. When I was a little girl, I used to feel romantic about Tars Tarkas...

what would my brother say?

Harry Warner: I agree that the advocates of the drug experience are rather naive about the "illumination" they receive. The pain-killing properties of some of these substances I can only commend, but the belief that the sensations of knowledge and power are unusual or permanent is erroneous. You are quite right that these sensations can be achieved by other means than the popular drugs. Fever, right. So also a good drunk can sometimes do it. The ascetic methods, hunger and pain long continued, will also bring on strange feelings of power--but they are usually negated by the fact that a starving man may think he can lift a ten-ton weight, but he can't actually even stand up. Meditation methods will often give new ideas, but hard, concentrated thought is supposed to do this, as is free association, too, so why bother with drugs if one is already capable of using his mind in many ways? I often think that those who are passionate about the possibilities of the drug experience are people who have never yet stretched their minds and need an outside method.

"Always tolerant and fair-minded, Gandhi doubted that only the sacred Hindu Vedas were the revealed word of God. 'Why not the Bible and the Koran?' he asked. He recoiled from rivalry between religions. In 1942, when I was his house guest, I noticed the one decoration on the mud walls of his little hut: a black-and-white print of Jesus Christ under which was written, 'He Is Our Peace'. I asked him about it. 'You are not a Christian,' I said.

"I am a Christian and a Hindu and a Moslem and a Jew," Gandhi replied. That made him a better Christian than most Christians." --Louis Fischer, in "Gandhi: His Life and Message for the World".

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Thanks for sending me this issue of Kipple, since I see that my name is being taken in vain by indirection. Dave Hulan says in one breath that the people holding out against the self-assumed God-powers of the Pacificon Committee are "a choice collection of the most notorious liars in science fiction fandom." Then in the next sentence he mentions me.

It is true what I said, as he quotes me. I did see Walter Breen in the incident with the Ellington child, as described in the Boondoggle. However, unlike Donaho in his write-up, I did not place such a huge value judgement on it. I don't care to go into details about what happened here in this letter, because I don't feel it is my role in life to spread further stories open to misinterpretation, but this I must and will say: that the child was not at all being "sexually aroused" nor was she angered by the incident. After all, how could a three-year-old be turned on sexually? When David Hulan was three years old, did he have experiences of sexual arousal over three-year-old girls? (It would be more to the point to ask: When Dave Hulan was three years old, could he have been sexually aroused by a determined woman?) The child dug the whole scene as a novelty, and that was all there was to it. If you would want to make a case of "child molestation" out of it, you would have to extend the definition of child molesting to include such actions as taking a child's hand in your own to help it cross the sidewalk, lifting it up to put it in bed at night, etc.

The child's reaction was to giggle for the duration of the occasion. I might add that during this period I was living in Berkeley and saw the Ellington child at frequent intervals, whenever I visited the Ellingtons. I used to do things like lift her by the ~~ears~~ hands and swing

her back and forth, or around me, and she giggled at that, too. It was kicks for her. She also used to giggle when I put her on the swing and swung her. I used to do these things because I like children and regard them as people who deserve to have fun, with you, in their own way. I guess this makes me a child molester...

I didn't hear Donaho make the remark attributed to him by Kevin Langdon, but I wouldn't doubt that Bill would say something like that in a moment of capriciousness. If the convention committee has one thing, it's a sense of humor.

"The scandal of modern education for slum children has lately become a matter of national discussion and worry. Since the Second World War, the gap has steadily widened between the educational accomplishments of middle-class children and of working-class children (particularly of Negro working-class children). Insensibly, our methods of instruction and our curriculum have come to assume greater and greater contributions by the home to the education of the child; and where these contributions are lacking, the schools are simply ineffective. The circle is as vicious as can be: because the school is ineffective, it is assumed that the child is no good, a proposition which is then verified by the class-biased IQ test; and because the child is no good, his teachers must not try to teach him much, for fear of damaging his mental health, until he finally emerges from the descending spiral, into the gutter, barely literate and thoroughly incompetent. This procedure is called 'democratic', because teachers are always telling the child about democracy, and supervisors are always telling teachers about democracy, and the supervisors of the supervisors are always telling the public about democracy. Clio, disguised as Lawrence Cremin, angrily calls, 'Fraud!'" --Martin Mayer, in Commentary, June, 1964.

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Your discussion of the good points of Karl Marx is vitiated by one major flaw: "unfettered capitalism" was not viciously exploiting and impoverishing the masses. It was, in fact, improving their lot. Working and living conditions of factory workers in the time of Marx were indeed hideous by modern standards, but, bad as they were, still they were an enormous improvement over what had preceded them.

In London in 1750, about 70 percent of children died before the age of five. In 1830, the rate was slightly under 30 percent. A little of the drop was due to medical advances, but much the greater part was due to the improvement of diet brought by the increasing productivity of the Industrial Revolution. In the same period, the population of England, which had for more than a century been static at about 5 or 6 million, rose to 16 million. Almost all of the 10 million increase owed their very existence to the rise of capitalism, which made it possible for them to be supported.

Even if there were no records of how mass living standards increased, it could be reliably deduced from the fact that the essence of the Industrial Revolution was the introduction of power machinery for mass production. Plainly, mass production was not devised to supply goods to the rich; there were not enough rich to make it worthwhile. What were mass produced, then, were goods for the masses. For an obvious example, the first major use of power machinery was in the textile mills. These machines did not make the fine linens and silks worn by the rich; they made cheap cotton stuffs for the poor, to replace the home-spuns.

We would certainly not like to labor twelve to fourteen hours a

day in one of those early factories, but we would like even less the alternative of eighteen hours of even more backbreaking work in the fields. Anyone who claims that the early factories were so horrible compared to the previous agrarian life will have to explain why farm laborers flocked to the factories.

The condition of the masses was not ameliorated by their growing political power so much as it was by the improving efficiency of the capitalist mode of production. For example, child labor did not die out because of laws; it disappeared because the rising wages paid by the capitalist exploiters made it possible for parents to support their children (and counties to support orphans) without the children having to work. Then, and only then, were laws passed to wipe out the few remaining anomalous pockets of child labor. Had such laws been enforced much earlier, the result would have been leisure for the children, and also starvation.

It is fascinating to read the arguments advanced in the early 1800's against the burgeoning factory system. Many landowners opposed it because the factories lured the peasants off the land, forcing the payment of higher wages to retain farm workers. The noted Dr. Turner Thakrah--who was by no means exceptional in his opinion--stated that the factory system bred immorality, in that the high wages allowed the lower classes to indulge in drunkenness and debauchery with unseemly frequency. I note here a remarkable similarity to the modern Galbraithian thesis that people should not be allowed to waste their money on cars with tailfins and suchlike gimcracks.

It has been established that many of the contemporary horror stories about factory conditions, which are now used as source material for anti-capitalistic writers, were the product of the nobility and great landowners who were seeing themselves effectively displaced from the ruling class by the "upstart" factory owners. A prime example is the Sadler Report (1832), on the iniquities of child labor in factories, which employed in wholesale lots what is now known as "McCarthyism". Even Friedrich Engels commented on its one-sidedness. The Sadler Report was rather fully refuted by a subsequent commission of inquiry, but it is still cited as a true picture of working conditions of the time. The best layman's discussion of the subject that I know of is "Capitalism and the Historians", edited by F. A. Hayek (Chicago, 1954).

I have used England as an example. Conditions were admittedly worse in most other European countries, precisely because they never had much of a free market. In Germany, that wily aristocrat Bismarck introduced a quasi-socialist welfare state precisely to head off the growing popular demand for laissez faire liberalism of the English model.

Though Marx was almost totally erroneous in his economic theory, and hopelessly slipshod in his history, his work did have two very real benefits. First, he brought into focus the importance of economics in shaping society. After Marx, no history or sociology could be taken seriously which did not examine the economic factors. Secondly, he illuminated the dignity of labor and wrought havoc with the pernicious delusion that "because our nails are clean or long we are essentially, in the quiddity of our humanity, better than the man who works with his hands." (Eliseo Vivas, "On the Conservative Demonology", Modern Age, Spring, 1964; an excellent discussion of the value in Marx and Freud.)

Commenting on my argument against the Supreme Court's "Prayer" decision, you say "Granted that the Supreme Court is not necessarily correct in its ruling, it seems the height of presumption for a layman to offhandedly dismiss Court decisions as erroneous. On what grounds are you better qualified that the Supreme Court to decide what is or is not constitutional?"

I reply first with a tu quoque: my presumption is roughly the

same height as your own, since you made bold to condemn another Supreme Court decision as "the most ignominious and contemptible decision in the annals of American jurisprudence." If you have a right to so characterize the Taney Court, and you do, then I surely may criticize the Warren Court. (When I characterized the Dred Scott decision as "ignominious and contemptible", I was advancing a judgement as to the justice and ethical acceptability of the decision, and I would certainly not object to your doing the same with regard to the decisions in Engel v. Vitale or Murray v. Curlett. However, when you criticized the Warren Court's school prayer decisions you contended that the majority of the Supreme Court had misinterpreted the Constitution, an accusation which I have never made with regard to the Dred Scott (or any other) decision. I grant that your (and my) opinion as to what is right is worth just as much as Chief Justice Warren's, but when the question is simply one of constitutionality, don't you think that the Justices of the Supreme Court are probably just a little better qualified to decide than either of us?)

You are jumping to conclusions when you call me a "layman" who "offhandedly" dismisses Court decisions. I do not possess a law degree (though I greatly doubt if you knew that), but I have, in my amateurish way, been studying constitutional law for about twenty years, and I believe with all modesty that I do know a little more about it than most laymen. Certainly, my opinions are not reached "offhandedly".

For a layman, the task of interpreting the Constitution is rendered vastly more easy by the fact that the Constitution, unlike most legal documents, is written in simple and pellucidly clear English.

Implicit in your comment is the assumption that the Supreme Court is a monolithic body; had you remembered that most of the Court's more controversial decisions have not been unanimous, you would have realized that in disagreeing with the "Warren Court", I am usually agreeing with the dissenting minority of that same Court? Or is that also presumptuous?

Turning to the substance of my opinion on the "Prayer" decision, in your article on "The Revolutionary Court" you grant my principal point, that the Court has taken to making law as well as enforcing it. You are exactly correct in describing the Warren Court as "revolutionary", and that is my objection to it. You say "...the Court has incurred the lasting animosity of those who...firmly believe that the judicial establishment should never be an innovatory body." Just so, although my animosity will last only until the appointment of a majority of justices who show a rigorous respect for the Constitution. I think it is very dangerous for the judiciary to assume an innovatory function, as that is to strike at the separation of powers, which is the fundamental basis of our government. (It is difficult to see how the Supreme Court could avoid "making law" unless it ceased altogether to discharge its duties. The enforcement of law is handled adequately by inferior courts and elected officials; the chief task of the Supreme Court is to monitor lesser government agencies and review legislation to insure that constitutional provisions are faithfully obeyed. But the Constitution is an ambiguous document, despite its pellucidly clear English, because it deals in broad, sweeping concepts, and most of its major provisions are open to wide interpretation. When the Supreme Court--whether it be the Warren Court or the Taney Court--interprets the Constitution in a way substantially different from previous interpretations, it is necessarily making law and assuming an innovatory function. What I think you chiefly object to is that the present Supreme Court is making liberal law rather than conservative law.)

In the discussion of whether juries should be replaced by computers, I see no mention of why the jury system originated. It was not

on the assumption that twelve laymen could interpret the evidence better than one trained judge. It was instead a defense against tyranny. Twelve good men and true, acquainted with the defendant, would be less likely to acquiesce in a government frame-up than would one judge controlled by the king.

As to why the old-time Socialists were wrong in claiming that the workers "could not buy back what they produced", the key is that the workers are not the only factor in production. The Socialists believed that profits are extorted from the worker, so that what the worker is paid is that much less than the value of what he produces. They failed to grasp that profits are the remuneration of investors whose money has been used to build and equip the factory. Since there can be no production without tools, the investors whose savings paid for the tools are fully entitled to share in the proceeds of production. The Socialist fallacy was to assume that all the "value added" in the production process is attributable to the worker, when in fact a large part of it should be credited to the tool-providing investors.

I offer the readers another little puzzle: In a free market economy, the proportions in which the proceeds of production are divided between workers and investors is not determined directly by any set formula; it is established by competition of workers for jobs, competition of employers for workers, and competition of investors for investment opportunities, etc. Now, in a pure communist or socialist society in which no such competition exists, how should we compute the division of the proceeds of production? (Bearing in mind that in a collectivist society, the investors' share is the State's share.)

While I am pleased that A. G. Smith is for Goldwater--who needs all the support he can get--I hope that Mr. Smith does not think that Goldwater, as President, would follow Mr. Smith's proposal to pull out of Vietnam. Read "Why Not Victory?" Whatever else Goldwater may be, he is no isolationist, and if he is elected we will probably be involved in more nasty little Vietnam-style wars. Which I think will be a damned good thing. For I believe that the most probable alternative to many little limited wars in the near future will be one big all-out war in the slightly more distant future, when the Communists have us with our backs to the wall because we did not destroy their strength piecemeal when we had the chance. To put it dramatically, we should fight the Communists in Vietnam in 1964, not because we love the Vietnamese people, but because this is better than fighting the Communists in Alaska in 1984.

President Johnson finally did something I approve of: the retaliatory raid on North Vietnam. I am not at all worried that the Communists will escalate. But I am suspicious that our new strong policy will last only for the duration--the duration of the election campaign, that is. I am waiting with cynical glee to see how the Liberal columnists and editorialists treat President Johnson for doing the sort of thing they have called Goldwater an insane warmonger for advocating. (It is a sad fact of human nature that, because of the impending election, many of those "Liberal columnists and editorialists" will either praise the President's excursion into brinksmanship or discreetly change the subject. Of course, Goldwater's supporters are prone to the same sort of hypocrisy: while many of them have eagerly pointed to Lyndon Johnson's reversal on civil rights, they have been considerably more reticent with regard to acknowledging Senator Goldwater's sudden changes of heart. I note that we both reach the same conclusion with regard to the extent to which our severe reaction in the Gulf of Tonkin was motivated by domestic political considerations, but whereas I fervently hope that this sort of "gunboat diplomacy" will be abandoned after November, you regret it. Perhaps the key to our disagreement is discernible in the fact that

you are "not at all worried that the Communists will escalate." Considering the terrifying consequences of modern warfare, I am suspicious of anyone who contemplates a confrontation without being at all worried.))

Remember, extremism in defense of the 7th Fleet is no vice, and moderation in pursuit of the enemy is no virtue.

"It is not true that socialism will arise automatically from the daily struggle of the working class. Socialism will be the consequence of (1), the growing contradictions of capitalist economy and (2), of the comprehension by the working class of the unavoidability of the suppression of these contradictions through a social transformation. When, in the manner of revisionism, the first condition is denied and the second rejected, the labor movement finds itself reduced to a simple corporative and reformist movement. We move here in a straight line toward the total abandonment of the class viewpoint." --Rosa Luxemburg, in "Reform or Revolution".

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According to you Karl Marx was a very fine sociologist. I have made no extensive study of Marx's work, but was under the impression that he predicted an upsurge of socialism culminating in a communist revolution in the industrial countries long before agricultural ones. How then is the fact that communism has taken root in countries primarily devoted to agriculture accounted for? (Karl Marx was the victim, so to speak, of the highly formalized framework--the dialectic--bequeathed to him by Hegel, according to which societies undergo the metamorphosis from imperfection to perfection in a very orderly manner. Human beings aren't especially orderly, however, and people impatient with their station in life are not inclined to calmly await the tedious historical process by means of which their societies progress from feudalism through capitalism to socialism and, eventually, communism. Communism has become a potent social and economic doctrine in agricultural countries because it seems to provide a shortcut to industrialization and therefore offers an underdeveloped country the opportunity to span hundreds of years of history in a few decades. As to why Marx failed to see this consequence of his doctrine, I suppose it is because Marx was himself a product of Western European capitalist society whose thinking was oriented, like so many 19th century Europeans, entirely toward his own particular corner of the world.))

Your reply to my comment on the Breen-Donaho affair serves to illustrate my point. You say that Walter Breen has not replied in kind to the attacks of Mr. Donaho. Why should I take your word for Breen's innocence over the word of someone else whom I also know only through very indirect contact? I will accept the story that Breen was denied membership in the World Science Fiction Convention because of his alleged child molestation. But after that, there are several alternatives to choose from. I can believe that (1) the whole thing is a personal campaign of Donaho's, (2) that it was a unanimous decision by the whole convention committee, (3) that the committee was acting upon the advice of a lawyer, (4) that it was not, (5) that the charges are true, (6) that the charges are false, (7) that it is impossible to prove or disprove the charges. Or I can admit that I do not possess enough reliable information to make a decision, that getting it would be nearly impossible, and remain "neutral".

If Red China takes over the parts of Southeast Asia still "free" and we find just that much more of the world against America to the point of possible war, let's all recall that it, after all, wasn't real-

ly worth the life of one American soldier. We may not be responsible for supporting other countries against Communism as she is practiced, but the stronger the Communist bloc gets, nationalism, Sino-Soviet schism and all, the weaker the so-called free world will be by comparison. Whether the Southeast Asians are a lot of flat-faced heathens or not, it is to the advantage of the United States to at least try to keep them on its side. It would be of doubtful wisdom to wait until China, Laos, Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia are ready to attack us before being willing to expend a little effort and suffer a number of casualties, instead of expending a little time and money (yes, and a few men) trying to keep the smaller Southeast Asian democracies (4?) from being swallowed up.

I hope A. G. Smith is willing to carry his ideas through the next logical step. What color are your eyes and hair, might I ask? Let us postulate that you are a blue-eyed brunette. Do you not feel a closer sense of kinship to people with blue eyes and dark hair than to people with neither? And, of course, you feel closer still to people with both. And how about head shapes? Length of fingers? Complexions? Nose shapes? Earlobes (attached or unattached)? Style of suit? Design of necktie? Color of socks?

I see from today's paper that ol' "drink-while-driving Johnson" is getting us ready for a war with China by demolishing the North Vietnamese PT-boat bases. To the hills, men!

The crux of the argument on the constitutionality of prayer in the public schools is whether the "free exercise" of religion includes non-religious attitudes and beliefs such as agnosticism, atheism, and so forth. An atheist who is forced to participate in any kind of religious service is having the free exercise of his religious ideas interfered with, even though he has no religion. I believe that either the passage should be interpreted so that any religious idea, whether it is a religion or not, may have protection equal to that of religion as such, or that the Constitution should be amended so that "religious ideas" is substituted for "religion".

Apparently I'd better learn to write, or re-read my letters more closely, or something. I seem to be spending as much time disowning others' interpretations of my remarks as anything constructive. (That sentence will probably be misconstrued also--and deservedly.) I did not mean that no head of state would be justified in starting or engaging in war, nuclear or otherwise. I meant, and said, that a war cannot be practically proved to be an expression of the general will. However, officials are supposedly elected because they will carry out what they believe to be right, and because what they deem right coincides with the general will for the most part. Otherwise they don't get re-elected. But to know that any action is an expression of the general will at a given time and under given circumstances would require a plebiscite or at least a Gallup Poll.

Why, may I ask Marty Helgesen, cannot the nature of the universe be existence? The fact that the universe consists of material objects doesn't prove anything. Furthermore, the cause of the universe we know is not necessarily the First Cause, if there be one. As you say, "some parts of the material universe pass on their existence." Why could the universe not have been created by, or out of, something or someone that was, in turn, created by something else, etc., until finally we reach some First Cause whose nature is to exist, rather than the direct creation you postulate? What evidence have you that, if there was a First Cause which directly created this universe, (1) it was sentient, aware, alive, or what have you, (2) it is still around, (3) it actually gives a damn about what goes on among men, (4) it is the same thing believed in by the ancient Jews, (5) Christ was the earthly representation

of God, and (6) He has been correctly quoted and interpreted? All of this must be demonstrated before you could prove Christianity. And as for proving the doctrines of any one sect or denomination, I could probably list several dozen propositions which would have to be conclusively proved.

As long as I'm on the subject of religion, I might mention that there has been a steady although not overwhelmingly large series of letters in the local newspapers, appearing at the rate of one or two a week, from pious ones who wish that the infidel be smitten by toughening up on godless Communism, striking down all the pernicious socialism cropping up in the government, and the like. Apparently no one has ever thought about the fact that Christianity by nature is highly socialistic. The first Christian communities were communistic; property belonged as much to one member as another, no matter who "owned" it. To effectively realize the idea of true Christian society, that is, one in which men extended perfect charity to one another, everyone lived according to Christian laws, and so forth, every man would have to produce to the best of his ability so that there would be sufficient goods for the community, and take only what he needed, so that there would be sufficient goods for each individual. However, this could get extremely complicated in a society of any size; there would have to be some sort of central authority to coordinate the thing. All the good intentions in the world won't help the starving people of flooded St. Louis if their share of the country's beef is somewhere west of the Rockies. A workable Christian society would entail an immense amount of administrative work; there would have to be a group with all the necessary information at hand and sufficient authority to enforce directives which might be improperly understood by the public. Due to the great size and varied terrain of the United States, a high degree of industrialization would be necessary--transportation, communication, and so forth. Thus, a true Christian society would bear a very close resemblance to communism, even in that a dictatorship would be necessary--benevolent and non-oppressive, to be sure, but a dictatorship.

The most dangerous effect of busing children to end de facto segregation is that people, both Negroes and Caucasians, might be lulled into a false sense of accomplishment. It is like giving aspirin to one with a brain tumor: the pain might stop or lessen for a while, but treating the symptoms instead of the disease has never been a reputable medical practice. And that is just what trans-schooling would be; de facto segregation is essentially an economic problem. Any program to alleviate the situation should take into account the fact that it can only be a temporary solution; to permanently solve the problem, more drastic measures are necessary.

"In so far as it knows the eternity of truth and is absorbed in it, the mind lives in that eternity. In caring only for the eternal, it has ceased to care for that part of itself which can die." --George Santayana, in "The Ethics of Spinoza".

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I agree with Jean Rose about non-genetic reproductive isolation, except that there are generally enough exceptions to the factor barring inter-breeding to prevent true isolation. I have watched enough fish migrations to know that there always seems to be a trickle of late-comers to the spring spawning and early birds to the fall one which meet on the spawning beds in mid-summer. And in at least one case with which I am most familiar (Salvelinus malma) one breeding pair could produce

enough offspring (20-30 thousand) to keep the genes mixed for a long time. Oh yes, I was discussing Anableps with an ichthyology professor one time and he ended the conversation with: "Whoever came to the conclusion that 'right-handed' and 'left-handed' types can't breed with a mate who has the organ of intromission on the same side doesn't realize a fish can swim just as well upsidedown as rightsideup."

A. G. Smith counters my statement that military conscription is a form of slavery by stating that by my chain of reasoning, compulsory school attendance is also slavery. I agree completely, Mr. Smith. Any situation in which an individual must, by threat of force, obey and work for another consistently and thereby consume most of his time is a form of slavery. Of course, the soldier's bonds of slavery are more rigid than those of the student in most cases (certain boarding schools excluded), but the difference is quantitative, not qualitative. For that matter, a child is the slave of his parents, and I doubt that many will disagree with this. But here's the major difference between the draft and compulsory schooling (or the whole parent-child relationship, since schools and teachers are merely partial substitutes for the parent, specialists to provide part of the greater whole of education necessary to produce an adult): the child has to be a slave, since he isn't capable of surviving on his own, but the soldier is an adult and making him a slave is therefore immoral.

"Yet, with all this strange appearance of humility and this contempt for human reason, the Christian ventures into the boldest presumptions; he finds fault with everything; his selfishness is never satisfied; his ingratitude is never at an end. He takes on himself to direct the Almighty what to do, even in the government of the universe; he prays dictatorially; when it is sunshine, he prays for rain, and when it is rain, he prays for sunshine; he follows the same idea in everything that he prays for; for what is the amount of all his prayers but an attempt to make the Almighty change his mind, and act otherwise than he does? It is as if he were to say: Thou knowest not so well as I."
--Thomas Paine, in "The Age of Reason".

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I have no intention of participating in any arguments with regard to this Breen business, and certainly not in any publication--not because I am "neutral", but because I think no good can come of any further discussion of the matter as long as such discussion is of a polemical nature. The Pacificon Committee has taken an action which is within its power; several people have disagreed with the Committee's action, and the Committee knows this; so what's the good of carrying this any further? Is it to persuade more people to stay away from the Pacificon? Why should anybody stay away? This is not the Committee's convention; it is the convention of science fiction fandom. The Pacificon Committee is only in temporary charge. The purpose of the convention is in no way dependent on the Committee, and the members of the Committee will not be hurt in any way whatsoever if any individuals decide to stay away. In the meantime, those who have boycotted it have forfeited their opportunity to hear the program and indulge in the socializing which is the purpose of a convention; and they have passed up a chance to tell the Committee members, in person, what is thought of their actions. You and Ted White and John Boardman may be right in your assessment of the morality of the Committee's action, but what good have you done, and what good are you doing, in continuing the argument now that everyone knows both sides of the story?

A. G. Smith saves Kipple from being a sort of left-wing National Review (that fascist rag). (I should explain that since "God Go Home", National Review, July 2, 1963, I have never used the name of that magazine in a sentence without the accompanying three-word description.) Publicola's essays don't provide much more than the usual sterile Conservative view of things. Haven't you any Objectivists in the audience? By the way, is Robert Heinlein an Objectivist? I'd be curious to know whether you all see any resemblance between his views, as expressed in his works of fiction, and those of Ayn Rand. I am told that I'm an Objectivist, but I don't know for sure as I haven't read any of Ayn Rand's books. But I do agree with most of Heinlein's views, as I said a few issues back when the argument over "Starship Troopers" was still going.


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"We may as well state at the outset that we are not seeking to persuade anyone of the virtues of any type, class, or breed of man, or of any special political or economic order of society. As biologists we view human differences as facts which call for understanding and interpretation, not as qualities to be either condemned or praised. In fact, in describing groups of men in biological terms, we do not recognize categories defined as 'good' or 'bad', 'superior' or 'inferior'. These general categories are statements of opinion; to have any meaning as facts they would have to be accompanied by specific statements such as 'Most Negroes are superior to most whites in their resistance to malaria,' or 'Most whites are superior to most Negroes in their resistance to tuberculosis.' Statements about the superiority of one group over another in native intelligence are usually made from the standpoint and for the purpose of one of the groups, under which the other must always be at a disadvantage." --L. C. Dunn and Theodosius Dobzhansky, in "Hereditry, Race and Society".

"The Vision of Christ that thou dost see
"Is my vision's greatest enemy."

--William Blake, in "The Everlasting Gospel"